.TH FIREJAIL 1 "MONTH YEAR" "VERSION" "firejail man page"
.SH NAME
Firejail \- Linux namespaces sandbox program
.SH SYNOPSIS
Start a sandbox:
.PP
.RS
firejail [OPTIONS] [program and arguments]
.RE
.PP
Start an AppImage program:
.PP
.RS
firejail [OPTIONS] --appimage [OPTIONS] [appimage-file and arguments]
.RE
.PP
#ifdef HAVE_FILE_TRANSFER
File transfer from an existing sandbox
.PP
.RS
firejail {\-\-ls | \-\-get | \-\-put | \-\-cat} dir_or_filename
.RE
.PP
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
Network traffic shaping for an existing sandbox:
.PP
.RS
firejail \-\-bandwidth={name|pid} bandwidth-command
.RE
.PP
#endif
Monitoring:
.PP
.RS
firejail {\-\-list | \-\-netstats | \-\-top | \-\-tree}
.RE
.PP
Miscellaneous:
.PP
.RS
firejail {\-? | \-\-debug-caps | \-\-debug-errnos | \-\-debug-syscalls | \-\-debug-syscalls32 | \-\-debug-protocols | \-\-help | \-\-version}
.RE
.SH DESCRIPTION
Firejail is a SUID sandbox program that reduces the risk of security breaches by
restricting the running environment of untrusted applications using Linux
namespaces, seccomp-bpf and Linux capabilities.
It allows a process and all its descendants to have their own private view of the
globally shared kernel resources, such as the network stack, process table, mount table.
Firejail can work in a SELinux or AppArmor environment,
and it is integrated with Linux Control Groups.
.PP
Written in C with virtually no dependencies, the software runs on any Linux computer with a 3.x kernel version
or newer.
It can sandbox any type of processes: servers, graphical applications, and even user login sessions.
.PP
Firejail allows the user to manage application security using security profiles.
Each profile defines a set of permissions for a specific application or group
of applications. The software includes security profiles for a number of more common
Linux programs, such as Mozilla Firefox, Chromium, VLC, Transmission etc.
.\" TODO: Explain the security/usability tradeoffs from #4601.
.PP
Firejail is currently implemented as an SUID binary, which means that if a
malicious or compromised user account manages to exploit a bug in Firejail,
that could ultimately lead to a privilege escalation to root.
To mitigate this, it is recommended to only allow trusted users to run firejail
(see firejail-users(5) for details on how to achieve that).
For more details on the security/usability tradeoffs of Firejail, see:
.UR https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/discussions/4601
#4601
.UE
.PP
Alternative sandbox technologies like snap (https://snapcraft.io/) and flatpak (https://flatpak.org/)
are not supported. Snap and flatpak packages have their own native management tools and will
not work when sandboxed with Firejail.

.SH USAGE
Without any options, the sandbox consists of a filesystem build in a new mount namespace,
and new PID and UTS namespaces. IPC, network and user namespaces can be added using the
command line options. The default Firejail filesystem is based on the host filesystem with the main
system directories mounted read-only. These directories are /etc, /var, /usr, /bin, /sbin, /lib, /lib32,
/libx32 and /lib64. Only /home and /tmp are writable.
.PP
Upon execution Firejail first looks in ~/.config/firejail/ for a profile and if it doesn't find one, it looks in /etc/firejail/.
For profile resolution detail see https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/wiki/Creating-Profiles#locations-and-types.
If an appropriate profile is not found, Firejail will use a default profile.
The default profile is quite restrictive. In case the application doesn't work, use --noprofile option
to disable it. For more information, please see \fBSECURITY PROFILES\fR section below.
.PP
If a program argument is not specified, Firejail starts the user's preferred shell.
Examples:
.PP
$ firejail [OPTIONS]                # starting the program specified in $SHELL, usually /bin/bash
.PP
$ firejail [OPTIONS] firefox        # starting Mozilla Firefox
.PP
# sudo firejail [OPTIONS] /etc/init.d/nginx start
.PP
When an option is specified multiple times (whether in a profile, on the
command line, or both) or conflicts with a related option, the
precedence/behavior is option-specific and usually documented in the
\fBOPTIONS\fR section below. Note that an option specified in a profile can
generally be disabled on the command line using \fB--ignore\fR.
.SH OPTIONS
.TP
\fB\-\-
Signal the end of options and disables further option processing.
.TP
\fB\-\-allow-debuggers
Allow tools such as strace and gdb inside the sandbox by whitelisting
system calls ptrace and process_vm_readv. This option is only
available when running on Linux kernels 4.8 or newer - a kernel bug in
ptrace system call allows a full bypass of the seccomp filter.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --allow-debuggers --profile=/etc/firejail/firefox.profile strace -f firefox
.TP
\fB\-\-allusers
All directories under /home are visible inside the sandbox. By default, only current user home directory is visible.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --allusers
#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
.TP
\fB\-\-apparmor
Enable AppArmor confinement with the "firejail-default" AppArmor profile.
For more information, please see \fBAPPARMOR\fR section below.
.TP
\fB\-\-apparmor=profile_name
Enable AppArmor confinement with a custom AppArmor profile.
Note that profile in question must already be loaded into the kernel.
For more information, please see \fBAPPARMOR\fR section below.
.TP
\fB\-\-apparmor.print=name|pid
Print the AppArmor confinement status for the sandbox identified by name or by PID.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-apparmor.print=browser
.br
5074:netblue:/usr/bin/firejail /usr/bin/firefox-esr
.br
  AppArmor: firejail-default enforce
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-appimage
Sandbox an AppImage (https://appimage.org/) application. If the sandbox is started
as a regular user, nonewprivs and a default capabilities filter are enabled.
private-bin and private-lib are disabled by default when running appimages.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --appimage --profile=krita krita-3.0-x86_64.appimage
.br
$ firejail --quiet --appimage --private --profile=krita krita-3.0-x86_64.appimage
.br
#ifdef HAVE_X11
$ firejail --appimage --net=none --x11 --profile=krita krita-3.0-x86_64.appimage
#endif
.br

.br
Note: When using both \fB--appimage\fR and \fB--profile\fR, it is recommended
to always specify the former before the latter, so that any \fB?HAS_APPIMAGE\fR
conditionals inside of the profile evaluate to true (see \fB?CONDITIONAL\fR in
firejail-profile(5)).
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-bandwidth=name|pid
Set bandwidth limits for the sandbox identified by name or PID, see \fBTRAFFIC SHAPING\fR section for more details.
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-bind=filename1,filename2
Mount-bind filename1 on top of filename2. This option is only available when running as root.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
# firejail \-\-bind=/config/etc/passwd,/etc/passwd
.TP
\fB\-\-blacklist=dirname_or_filename
Blacklist directory or file. This makes a file or directory
completely inaccessible. All other files and directories are unaffected.
The blacklisted file or directory is still visible on the filesystem,
even if it's inaccessible.
.br

.br
Symbolic link handling: Blacklisting a path that is a symbolic link will also
blacklist the path that it points to.
For example, if ~/foo is blacklisted and it points to /bar, then /bar will also
be blacklisted.
.br

.br
File globbing is supported, see \fBFILE GLOBBING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-blacklist=/sbin \-\-blacklist=/usr/sbin
.br
$ firejail \-\-blacklist=~/.mozilla
.br
$ firejail \-\-blacklist="/home/username/My Virtual Machines"
.br
$ firejail \-\-blacklist=/home/username/My\\ Virtual\\ Machines
.TP
\fB\-\-build
The command builds a whitelisted profile. The profile is printed on the screen. The program is run in a very relaxed sandbox, with only \-\-caps.drop=all and \-\-seccomp=!chroot. Programs that raise user privileges are not supported.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-build vlc ~/Videos/test.mp4
.br
$ firejail \-\-build \-\-appimage ~/Downloads/Subsurface.AppImage
.TP
\fB\-\-build=profile-file
The command builds a whitelisted profile, and saves it in profile-file. The program is run in a very relaxed sandbox,
with only \-\-caps.drop=all and \-\-seccomp=!chroot. Programs that raise user privileges are not supported.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-build=vlc.profile vlc ~/Videos/test.mp4
.br
$ firejail \-\-build=Subsurface.profile \-\-appimage ~/Downloads/Subsurface.AppImage
.TP
\fB\-c
Login shell compatibility option. This option is use by some login programs when executing
the login shell, such as when firejail is used as a restricted login shell. It currently does
not change the execution of firejail.
.TP
\fB\-\-caps
Linux capabilities is a kernel feature designed to split up the root privilege into a set of distinct privileges.
These privileges can be enabled or disabled independently, thus restricting what a process running
as root can do in the system.
See capabilities(7) for details.

By default root programs run with all capabilities enabled. \-\-caps option disables the following capabilities:
CAP_SYS_MODULE, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
CAP_SYS_BOOT, CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, CAP_SYSLOG, CAP_MKNOD, CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
The filter is applied to all processes started in the sandbox.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo firejail \-\-caps /etc/init.d/nginx start

.TP
\fB\-\-caps.drop=all
Drop all capabilities for the processes running in the sandbox. This option is recommended for running GUI programs
or any other program that doesn't require root privileges. It is a must-have option for sandboxing untrusted programs
installed from unofficial sources - such as games, Java programs, etc.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-caps.drop=all warzone2100

.TP
\fB\-\-caps.drop=capability,capability,capability
Define a custom blacklist Linux capabilities filter.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-caps.drop=net_broadcast,net_admin,net_raw

.TP
\fB\-\-caps.keep=capability,capability,capability
Define a custom whitelist Linux capabilities filter.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo firejail \-\-caps.keep=chown,net_bind_service,setgid,\\
setuid /etc/init.d/nginx start

.TP
\fB\-\-caps.print=name|pid
Print the caps filter for the sandbox identified by name or by PID.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=mygame \-\-caps.drop=all warzone2100 &
.br
$ firejail \-\-caps.print=mygame
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-list
.br
3272:netblue::firejail \-\-private firefox
.br
$ firejail \-\-caps.print=3272

#ifdef HAVE_FILE_TRANSFER
.TP
\fB\-\-cat=name|pid filename
Print content of file from sandbox container, see FILE TRANSFER section for more details.
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CHROOT
.TP
\fB\-\-chroot=dirname
Chroot the sandbox into a root filesystem. Unlike the regular filesystem container,
the system directories are mounted read-write. If the sandbox is started as a
regular user, nonewprivs and a default capabilities filter are enabled.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-chroot=/media/ubuntu warzone2100
.br

.br
For automatic mounting of X11 and PulseAudio sockets set environment variables
FIREJAIL_CHROOT_X11 and FIREJAIL_CHROOT_PULSE.
.br

.br
Note: Support for this command is controlled in firejail.config with the
\fBchroot\fR option.
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-cpu=cpu-number,cpu-number,cpu-number
Set CPU affinity.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-cpu=0,1 handbrake

.TP
\fB\-\-cpu.print=name|pid
Print the CPU cores in use by the sandbox identified by name or by PID.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=mygame \-\-caps.drop=all warzone2100 &
.br
$ firejail \-\-cpu.print=mygame
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-list
.br
3272:netblue::firejail \-\-private firefox
.br
$ firejail \-\-cpu.print=3272
#ifdef HAVE_DBUSPROXY
.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-log=file
Specify the location for the DBus log file.
.br

.br
The log file contains events for both the system and session buses if both of
the --dbus-system.log and --dbus-user.log options are specified. If no log file
path is given, logs are written to the standard output instead.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-system=filter --dbus-system.log \\
.br
--dbus-log=dbus.txt

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-system=filter|none
Set system DBus sandboxing policy.
.br

.br
The \fBfilter\fR policy enables the system DBus filter. This option requires
installing the xdg-dbus-proxy utility. Permissions for well-known can be
specified with the --dbus-system.talk and --dbus-system.own options.
.br

.br
The \fBnone\fR policy disables access to the system DBus.
.br

.br
Only the regular system DBus UNIX socket is handled by this option. To disable
the abstract sockets (and force applications to use the filtered UNIX socket)
you would need to request a new network namespace using \-\-net command. Another
option is to remove unix from the \-\-protocol set.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-dbus-system=none

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-system.broadcast=name=[member][@path]
Allows the application to receive broadcast signals from the indicated interface
member at the indicated object path exposed by the indicated bus name on the
system DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including
itself.
The interface member may have a .* to match all members of an interface, or be * to match all interfaces.
The path may have a /* suffix to indicate all objects underneath it, including
itself.
Omitting the interface member or the object path will match all members and
object paths, respectively.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-system=filter --dbus-system.broadcast=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications.*@/org/freedesktop/Notifications

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-system.call=name=[member][@path]
Allows the application to call the indicated interface member at the indicated
object path exposed by the indicated bus name on the system DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including
itself.
The interface member may have a .* to match all members of an interface, or be * to match all interfaces.
The path may have a /* suffix to indicate all objects underneath it, including
itself.
Omitting the interface member or the object path will match all members and
object paths, respectively.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-system=filter --dbus-system.call=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications.*@/org/freedesktop/Notifications

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-system.log
Turn on DBus logging for the system DBus. This option requires --dbus-system=filter.

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-system=filter --dbus-system.log

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-system.own=name
Allows the application to own the specified well-known name on the system DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including itself
(e.g. "foo.bar.*" matches "foo.bar", "foo.bar.baz" and "foo.bar.baz.quux", but
not "foobar").
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-system=filter --dbus-system.own=\\
.br
org.gnome.ghex.*

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-system.see=name
Allows the application to see, but not talk to the specified well-known name on
the system DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including itself
(e.g. "foo.bar.*" matches "foo.bar", "foo.bar.baz" and "foo.bar.baz.quux", but
not "foobar").
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-system=filter --dbus-system.see=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-system.talk=name
Allows the application to talk to the specified well-known name on the system DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including itself
(e.g. "foo.bar.*" matches "foo.bar", "foo.bar.baz" and "foo.bar.baz.quux", but
not "foobar").
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-system=filter --dbus-system.talk=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-user=filter|none
Set session DBus sandboxing policy.
.br

.br
The \fBfilter\fR policy enables the session DBus filter. This option requires
installing the xdg-dbus-proxy utility. Permissions for well-known names can be
added with the --dbus-user.talk and --dbus-user.own options.
.br

.br
The \fBnone\fR policy disables access to the session DBus.
.br

.br
Only the regular session DBus UNIX socket is handled by this option. To disable
the abstract sockets (and force applications to use the filtered UNIX socket)
you would need to request a new network namespace using \-\-net command. Another
option is to remove unix from the \-\-protocol set.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-dbus-user=none

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-user.broadcast=name=[member][@path]
Allows the application to receive broadcast signals from the indicated interface
member at the indicated object path exposed by the indicated bus name on the
session DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including
itself.
The interface member may have a .* to match all members of an interface, or be * to match all interfaces.
The path may have a /* suffix to indicate all objects underneath it, including
itself.
Omitting the interface member or the object path will match all members and
object paths, respectively.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-user=filter --dbus-user.broadcast=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications.*@/org/freedesktop/Notifications

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-user.call=name=[member][@path]
Allows the application to call the indicated interface member at the indicated
object path exposed by the indicated bus name on the session DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including
itself.
The interface member may have a .* to match all members of an interface, or be * to match all interfaces.
The path may have a /* suffix to indicate all objects underneath it, including
itself.
Omitting the interface member or the object path will match all members and
object paths, respectively.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-user=filter --dbus-user.call=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications.*@/org/freedesktop/Notifications

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-user.log
Turn on DBus logging for the session DBus. This option requires --dbus-user=filter.

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-user=filter --dbus-user.log

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-user.own=name
Allows the application to own the specified well-known name on the session DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including itself
(e.g. "foo.bar.*" matches "foo.bar", "foo.bar.baz" and "foo.bar.baz.quux", but
not "foobar").
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-user=filter --dbus-user.own=org.gnome.ghex.*

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-user.see=name
Allows the application to see, but not talk to the specified well-known name on
the session DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including itself
(e.g. "foo.bar.*" matches "foo.bar", "foo.bar.baz" and "foo.bar.baz.quux", but
not "foobar").
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-user=filter --dbus-user.see=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications

.TP
\fB\-\-dbus-user.talk=name
Allows the application to talk to the specified well-known name on the session DBus.
The name may have a .* suffix to match all names underneath it, including itself
(e.g. "foo.bar.*" matches "foo.bar", "foo.bar.baz" and "foo.bar.baz.quux", but
not "foobar").
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --dbus-user=filter --dbus-user.talk=\\
.br
org.freedesktop.Notifications
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-debug\fR
Print debug messages.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-debug firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-debug-blacklists\fR
Debug blacklisting.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-debug-blacklists firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-debug-caps
Print all recognized capabilities in the current Firejail software build and exit.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-debug-caps

.TP
\fB\-\-debug-errnos
Print all recognized error numbers in the current Firejail software build and exit.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-debug-errnos
#ifdef HAVE_PRIVATE_LIB
.TP
\fB\-\-debug-private-lib
Debug messages for --private-lib option.
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-debug-protocols
Print all recognized protocols in the current Firejail software build and exit.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-debug-protocols
.TP
\fB\-\-debug-syscalls
Print all recognized system calls in the current Firejail software build and exit.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-debug-syscalls
.TP
\fB\-\-debug-syscalls32
Print all recognized 32 bit system calls in the current Firejail software build and exit.
.br
.TP
\fB\-\-debug-whitelists\fR
Debug whitelisting.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-debug-whitelists firefox
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-defaultgw=address
Use this address as default gateway in the new network namespace.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-defaultgw=10.10.20.1 firefox
#endif

.TP
\fB\-\-deterministic-exit-code
Always exit firejail with the first child's exit status. The default behavior is to use the exit status of the final child to exit, which can be nondeterministic.
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-deterministic-shutdown
Always shut down the sandbox after the first child has terminated. The default behavior is to keep the sandbox alive as long as it contains running processes.
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-disable-mnt
Blacklist /mnt, /media, /run/mount and /run/media access.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-disable-mnt firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-dns=address
Set a DNS server for the sandbox. Up to three DNS servers can be defined.
Use this option if you don't trust the DNS setup on your network.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-dns=8.8.8.8 \-\-dns=8.8.4.4 firefox
.br

.br
Note: this feature is not supported on systemd-resolved setups.
.TP
\fB\-\-dns.print=name|pid
Print DNS configuration for a sandbox identified by name or by PID.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=mygame \-\-caps.drop=all warzone2100 &
.br
$ firejail \-\-dns.print=mygame
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-list
.br
3272:netblue::firejail \-\-private firefox
.br
$ firejail \-\-dns.print=3272

.TP
\fB\-\-dnstrace[=name|pid]
Monitor DNS queries. The sandbox can be specified by name or pid. Only networked sandboxes
created with \-\-net are supported. This option is only available when running the sandbox as root.
.br

.br
Without a name/pid, Firejail will monitor the main system network namespace.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo firejail --dnstrace
.br
11:31:43  9.9.9.9        linux.com (type 1)
.br
11:31:45  9.9.9.9        fonts.googleapis.com (type 1) NXDOMAIN
.br
11:31:45  9.9.9.9        js.hs-scripts.com (type 1) NXDOMAIN
.br
11:31:45  9.9.9.9        www.linux.com (type 1)
.br
11:31:45  9.9.9.9        fonts.googleapis.com (type 1) NXDOMAIN
.br
11:31:52  9.9.9.9        js.hs-scripts.com (type 1) NXDOMAIN
.br
11:32:05  9.9.9.9        secure.gravatar.com (type 1)
.br
11:32:06  9.9.9.9        secure.gravatar.com (type 1)
.br
11:32:08  9.9.9.9        taikai.network (type 1)
.br
11:32:08  9.9.9.9        cdn.jsdelivr.net (type 1)
.br
11:32:08  9.9.9.9        taikai.azureedge.net (type 1)
.br
11:32:08  9.9.9.9        www.youtube.com (type 1)
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-env=name=value
Set environment variable in the new sandbox.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-env=LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/test/lib

.TP
\fB\-\-fs.print=name|pid
Print the filesystem log for the sandbox identified by name or by PID.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=mygame \-\-caps.drop=all warzone2100 &
.br
$ firejail \-\-fs.print=mygame
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-list
.br
3272:netblue::firejail \-\-private firefox
.br
$ firejail \-\-fs.print=3272

#ifdef HAVE_FILE_TRANSFER
.TP
\fB\-\-get=name|pid filename
Get a file from sandbox container, see \fBFILE TRANSFER\fR section for more details.
#endif
.TP
\fB\-?\fR, \fB\-\-help\fR
Print options end exit.


.TP
\fB\-\-hostname=name
Set sandbox hostname.
.br
For valid names, see the \fBNAME VALIDATION\fR section.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-hostname=officepc firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-hosts-file=file
Use file as /etc/hosts.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-hosts-file=~/myhosts firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-icmptrace[=name|pid]
Monitor ICMP traffic. The sandbox can be specified by name or pid. Only networked sandboxes
created with \-\-net are supported. This option is only available when running the sandbox as root.
.br

.br
Without a name/pid, Firejail will monitor the main system network namespace.
.br

.br
Example
.br
$ sudo firejail --icmptrace
.br
20:53:54  192.168.1.60 -> 142.250.65.174 - 98 bytes - Echo request/0
.br
20:53:54  142.250.65.174 -> 192.168.1.60 - 98 bytes - Echo reply/0
.br
20:53:55  192.168.1.60 -> 142.250.65.174 - 98 bytes - Echo request/0
.br
20:53:55  142.250.65.174 -> 192.168.1.60 - 98 bytes - Echo reply/0
.br
20:53:55  192.168.1.60 -> 1.1.1.1 - 154 bytes - Destination unreachable/Port unreachable
.br

#ifdef HAVE_IDS
.TP
\fB\-\-ids-check
Check file hashes previously generated by \-\-ids-check. See INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-ids-check

.TP
\fB\-\-ids-init
Initialize file hashes. See INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-ids-init
#endif

.TP
\fB\-\-ignore=command
Ignore command in profile file.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --ignore=seccomp --ignore=caps firefox
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.br
$ firejail \-\-ignore="net eth0" firefox
#endif

.TP
\fB\-\-include=file.profile
Include a profile file before the regular profiles are used.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --include=/etc/firejail/disable-devel.inc gedit

#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-interface=interface
Move interface in a new network namespace. Up to four --interface options can be specified.
Note: wlan devices are not supported for this option.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-interface=eth1 \-\-interface=eth0.vlan100

.TP
\fB\-\-ip=address
Assign IP addresses to the last network interface defined by a \-\-net option. A
default gateway is assigned by default.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-ip=10.10.20.56 firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-ip=dhcp
Acquire an IP address and default gateway for the last interface defined by a
\-\-net option, as well as set the DNS servers according to the DHCP response.
This option requires the ISC dhclient DHCP client to be installed and will start
it automatically inside the sandbox.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=br0 \-\-ip=dhcp
.br

.br
This option should not be used in conjunction with the \-\-dns option if the
DHCP server is set to configure DNS servers for the clients, because the
manually specified DNS servers will be overwritten.

.br
The DHCP client will NOT release the DHCP lease when the sandbox terminates.
If your DHCP server requires leases to be explicitly released, consider running
a DHCP client and releasing the lease manually in conjunction with the
\-\-net=none option.

.TP
\fB\-\-ip=none
No IP address and no default gateway are configured for the last interface
defined by a \-\-net option. Use this option
in case you intend to start an external DHCP client in the sandbox.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-ip=none
.br

.br
If the corresponding interface doesn't have an IP address configured, this
option is enabled by default.

.TP
\fB\-\-ip6=address
Assign IPv6 addresses to the last network interface defined by a \-\-net option.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-ip6=2001:0db8:0:f101::1/64 firefox

Note: you don't need this option if you obtain your ip6 address from router via SLAAC (your ip6 address and default route will be configured by kernel automatically).

.TP
\fB\-\-ip6=dhcp
Acquire an IPv6 address and default gateway for the last interface defined by a
\-\-net option, as well as set the DNS servers according to the DHCP response.
This option requires the ISC dhclient DHCP client to be installed and will start
it automatically inside the sandbox.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=br0 \-\-ip6=dhcp
.br

.br
This option should not be used in conjunction with the \-\-dns option if the
DHCP server is set to configure DNS servers for the clients, because the
manually specified DNS servers will be overwritten.

.br
The DHCP client will NOT release the DHCP lease when the sandbox terminates.
If your DHCP server requires leases to be explicitly released, consider running
a DHCP client and releasing the lease manually.

.TP
\fB\-\-iprange=address,address
Assign an IP address in the provided range to the last network interface defined by a \-\-net option. A
default gateway is assigned by default.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-iprange=192.168.1.100,192.168.1.150

.TP
\fB\-\-ipc-namespace
Enable a new IPC namespace if the sandbox was started as a regular user. IPC namespace is enabled by default
for sandboxes started as root.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-ipc-namespace firefox
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-join=name|pid
Join the sandbox identified by name or by PID. By default a /bin/bash shell is started after joining the sandbox.
If a program is specified, the program is run in the sandbox. If \-\-join command is issued as a regular user,
all security filters are configured for the new process the same they are configured in the sandbox.
If \-\-join command is issued as root, the security filters and cpus configurations are not applied
to the process joining the sandbox.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=mygame \-\-caps.drop=all warzone2100 &
.br
$ firejail \-\-join=mygame
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-list
.br
3272:netblue::firejail \-\-private firefox
.br
$ firejail \-\-join=3272

.TP
\fB\-\-join-filesystem=name|pid
Join the mount namespace of the sandbox identified by name or PID. By default a /bin/bash shell is started after joining the sandbox.
If a program is specified, the program is run in the sandbox. This command is available only to root user.
Security filters and cpus configurations are not applied to the process joining the sandbox.
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-join-network=name|pid
Join the network namespace of the sandbox identified by name. By default a /bin/bash shell is started after joining the sandbox.
If a program is specified, the program is run in the sandbox. This command is available only to root user.
Security filters and cpus configurations are not applied to the process joining the sandbox. Example:
.br

.br
# start firefox
.br
$ firejail --net=eth0 --name=browser firefox &
.br

.br
# change netfilter configuration
.br
$ sudo firejail --join-network=browser bash -c "cat /etc/firejail/nolocal.net | /sbin/iptables-restore"
.br

.br
# verify netfilter configuration
.br
$ sudo firejail --join-network=browser /sbin/iptables -vL
.br

.br
# verify IP addresses
.br
$ sudo firejail --join-network=browser ip addr
.br
Switching to pid 1932, the first child process inside the sandbox
.br
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default
.br
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
.br
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
.br
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
.br
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
.br
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
.br
2: eth0-1931: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default
.br
    link/ether 76:58:14:42:78:e4 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
.br
    inet 192.168.1.158/24 brd 192.168.1.255 scope global eth0-1931
.br
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
.br
    inet6 fe80::7458:14ff:fe42:78e4/64 scope link
.br
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-join-or-start=name
Join the sandbox identified by name or start a new one.
Same as "firejail --join=name" if sandbox with specified name exists, otherwise
same as "firejail --name=name ...".
See \fB\-\-name\fR for details.
.br
Note that in contrary to other join options there is respective profile option.

.TP
\fB\-\-keep-config-pulse
Disable automatic ~/.config/pulse init, for complex setups such as remote
pulse servers or non-standard socket paths.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-keep-config-pulse firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-keep-dev-shm
/dev/shm directory is untouched (even with --private-dev)
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --keep-dev-shm --private-dev

.TP
\fB\-\-keep-fd=all
Inherit all open file descriptors to the sandbox. By default only file descriptors 0, 1 and 2 are inherited to the sandbox, and all other file descriptors are closed.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --keep-fd=all

.TP
\fB\-\-keep-fd=file_descriptor
Don't close specified open file descriptors. By default only file descriptors 0, 1 and 2 are inherited to the sandbox, and all other file descriptors are closed.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --keep-fd=3,4,5

.TP
\fB\-\-keep-shell-rc
By default, when using a private home directory, firejail copies files from the
system's user home template (/etc/skel) into it, which overrides attempts to
whitelist the original files (such as ~/.bashrc and ~/.zshrc).
This option disables this feature, and enables the user to whitelist the
original files.

.TP
\fB\-\-keep-var-tmp
/var/tmp directory is untouched.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --keep-var-tmp

#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
.TP
\fB\-\-landlock.enforce\fR (experimental)
Enforce the Landlock ruleset.
Without it, the other Landlock commands have no effect.
See the \fBLANDLOCK\fR section for more information.
.TP
\fB\-\-landlock.fs.read=path\fR (experimental)
Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a read access
rule for path.
.TP
\fB\-\-landlock.fs.write=path\fR (experimental)
Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a write access
rule for path.
.TP
\fB\-\-landlock.fs.makeipc=path\fR (experimental)
Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a rule that
allows the creation of named pipes (FIFOs) and Unix domain sockets beneath
the given path.
.TP
\fB\-\-landlock.fs.makedev=path\fR (experimental)
Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add a rule that
allows the creation of block devices and character devices beneath the given
path.
.TP
\fB\-\-landlock.fs.execute=path\fR (experimental)
Create a Landlock ruleset (if it doesn't already exist) and add an execution
permission rule for path.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-landlock.fs.read=/ \-\-landlock.fs.write=/home
\-\-landlock.fs.execute=/usr \-\-landlock.enforce
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-list
List all sandboxes, see \fBMONITORING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-list
.br
7015:netblue:browser:firejail firefox
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.br
7056:netblue:torrent:firejail \-\-net=eth0 transmission-gtk
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_USERNS
.br
7064:netblue::firejail \-\-noroot xterm
.br
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FILE_TRANSFER
.TP
\fB\-\-ls=name|pid dir_or_filename
List files in sandbox container, see \fBFILE TRANSFER\fR section for more details.
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-mac=address
Assign MAC addresses to the last network interface defined by a \-\-net option. This option
is not supported for wireless interfaces.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-mac=00:11:22:33:44:55 firefox
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-machine-id
Spoof id number in /etc/machine-id file - a new random id is generated inside the sandbox.
Note that this breaks audio support. Enable it when sound is not required.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-machine-id

.TP
\fB\-\-memory-deny-write-execute
Install a seccomp filter to block attempts to create memory mappings
that are both writable and executable, to change mappings to be
executable, or to create executable shared memory. The filter examines
the arguments of mmap, mmap2, mprotect, pkey_mprotect, memfd_create
and shmat system calls and returns error EPERM to the process (or
kills it or log the attempt, see \-\-seccomp-error-action below) if necessary.
.br

.br
Note: shmat is not implemented
as a system call on some platforms including i386, and it cannot be
handled by seccomp-bpf.

.TP
\fB\-\-mkdir=dirname
Create a directory in user home. Parent directories are created as needed.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --mkdir=~/work/project

.TP
\fB\-\-mkfile=filename
Create an empty file in user home.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --mkfile=~/work/project/readme

#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-mtu=number
Assign a MTU value to the last network interface defined by a \-\-net option.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-mtu=1492
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-name=name
Set sandbox name. Several options, such as \-\-join and \-\-shutdown, can use
this name to identify a sandbox.
The name cannot contain only digits, as that is treated as a PID in the other
options, such as in \-\-join.
.br
For valid names, see the \fBNAME VALIDATION\fR section.
.br

.br
In case the name supplied by the user is already in use by another sandbox, Firejail will assign a
new name as "name-PID", where PID is the process ID of the sandbox. This functionality
can be disabled at run time in /etc/firejail/firejail.config file, by setting "name-change" flag to "no".
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=browser firefox &
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=browser \-\-private \
firefox \-\-no-remote &
.br
$ firejail --list
.br
1198:netblue:browser:firejail --name=browser firefox
.br
1312:netblue:browser-1312:firejail --name=browser --private firefox --no-remote
.br
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-net=bridge_interface
Enable a new network namespace and connect it to this bridge interface.
Unless specified with option \-\-ip and \-\-defaultgw, an IP address and a default gateway will be assigned
automatically to the sandbox. The IP address is verified using ARP before assignment. The address
configured as default gateway is the bridge device IP address. Up to four \-\-net
options can be specified.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo brctl addbr br0
.br
$ sudo ifconfig br0 10.10.20.1/24
.br
$ sudo brctl addbr br1
.br
$ sudo ifconfig br1 10.10.30.1/24
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=br0 \-\-net=br1

.TP
\fB\-\-net=ethernet_interface|wireless_interface
Enable a new network namespace and connect it
to this ethernet interface using the standard Linux macvlan|ipvlan
driver. Unless specified with option \-\-ip and \-\-defaultgw, an
IP address and a default gateway will be assigned automatically
to the sandbox. The IP address is verified using ARP before
assignment. The address configured as default gateway is the
default gateway of the host. Up to four \-\-net options can be specified.
Support for ipvlan driver was introduced in Linux kernel 3.19.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-ip=192.168.1.80 \-\-dns=8.8.8.8 firefox
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=wlan0 firefox
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-net=none
Enable a new, unconnected network namespace. The only interface
available in the new namespace is a new loopback interface (lo).
Use this option to deny
network access to programs that don't really need network access.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=none vlc
.br

.br
Note: \-\-net=none can crash the application on some platforms.
In these cases, it can be replaced with \-\-protocol=unix.
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-net=tap_interface
Enable a new network namespace and connect it
to this ethernet tap interface using the standard Linux macvlan
driver. If the tap interface is not configured, the sandbox
will not try to configure the interface inside the sandbox.
Please use \-\-ip, \-\-netmask and \-\-defaultgw to specify the configuration.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=tap0 \-\-ip=10.10.20.80 \-\-netmask=255.255.255.0 \-\-defaultgw=10.10.20.1 firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-net.print=name|pid
If a new network namespace is enabled, print network interface configuration for the sandbox specified by name or PID. Example:
.br

.br
$ firejail --net.print=browser
.br
Switching to pid 1853, the first child process inside the sandbox
.br
Interface  MAC               IP            Mask        Status
.br
lo                           127.0.0.1     255.0.0.0     UP
.br
eth0-1852  5e:fb:8e:27:29:26 192.168.1.186 255.255.255.0 UP
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-netfilter
Enable a default firewall if a new network namespace is created inside the sandbox.
This option has no effect for sandboxes using the system network namespace.
.br

.br
The default firewall is optimized for regular desktop applications. No incoming
connections are accepted:
.br

.br
*filter
.br
:INPUT DROP [0:0]
.br
:FORWARD DROP [0:0]
.br
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
.br
\-A INPUT \-i lo \-j ACCEPT
.br
\-A INPUT \-m state \-\-state RELATED,ESTABLISHED \-j ACCEPT
.br
# allow ping
.br
\-A INPUT \-p icmp \-\-icmp-type destination-unreachable \-j ACCEPT
.br
\-A INPUT \-p icmp \-\-icmp-type time-exceeded \-j ACCEPT
.br
\-A INPUT \-p icmp \-\-icmp-type echo-request \-j ACCEPT
.br
# drop STUN (WebRTC) requests
.br
-A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 3478 -j DROP
.br
-A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 3479 -j DROP
.br
-A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 3478 -j DROP
.br
-A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 3479 -j DROP
.br
COMMIT
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-netfilter firefox
.TP
\fB\-\-netfilter=filename
Enable the firewall specified by filename if a new network namespace is created inside the sandbox.
This option has no effect for sandboxes using the system network namespace.
.br

.br
Please use the regular iptables-save/iptables-restore format for the filter file. The following
examples are available in /etc/firejail directory:
.br

.br
.B webserver.net
is a webserver firewall that allows access only to TCP ports 80 and 443.
Example:
.br

.br
$ firejail --netfilter=/etc/firejail/webserver.net --net=eth0 \\
.br
/etc/init.d/apache2 start
.br

.br
.B nolocal.net/nolocal6.net
is a desktop client firewall that disable access to local network. Example:
.br

.br
$ firejail --netfilter=/etc/firejail/nolocal.net \\
.br
--net=eth0 firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-netfilter=filename,arg1,arg2,arg3 ...
This is the template version of the previous command. $ARG1, $ARG2, $ARG3 ... in the firewall script
are replaced with arg1, arg2, arg3 ... passed on the command line. Up to 16 arguments are supported.
Example:
.br

.br
$ firejail --net=eth0 --ip=192.168.1.105 \\
.br
--netfilter=/etc/firejail/tcpserver.net,5001 server-program
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-netfilter.print=name|pid
Print the firewall installed in the sandbox specified by name or PID. Example:
.br

.br
$ firejail --name=browser --net=eth0 --netfilter firefox &
.br
$ firejail --netfilter.print=browser

.TP
\fB\-\-netfilter6=filename
Enable the IPv6 firewall specified by filename if a new network namespace is created inside the sandbox.
This option has no effect for sandboxes using the system network namespace.
Please use the regular iptables-save/iptables-restore format for the filter file.

.TP
\fB\-\-netfilter6.print=name|pid
Print the IPv6 firewall installed in the sandbox specified by name or PID. Example:
.br

.br
$ firejail --name=browser --net=eth0 --netfilter firefox &
.br
$ firejail --netfilter6.print=browser

.TP
\fB\-\-netlock
Several type of programs (email clients, multiplayer games etc.) talk to a very small
number of IP addresses. But the best example is tor browser. It only talks to a guard node,
and there are two or three more on standby in case the main one fails.
During startup, the browser contacts all of them, after that it keeps talking to the main
one... for weeks!

Use the network locking feature to build and deploy a custom network firewall in your sandbox.
The firewall allows only the traffic to the IP addresses detected during the program
startup. Traffic to any other address is quietly dropped. By default the network monitoring
time is one minute.

A network namespace (\-\-net=eth0) is required for this feature to work. Example:
.br

.br
$ firejail --net=eth0 --netlock \\
.br
--private=~/tor-browser_en-US ./start-tor-browser.desktop
.br

.br

.TP
\fB\-\-netmask=address
Use this option when you want to assign an IP address in a new namespace and
the parent interface specified by --net is not configured. An IP address and
a default gateway address also have to be added. By default the new namespace
interface comes without IP address and default gateway configured. Example:
.br

.br
$ sudo /sbin/brctl addbr br0
.br
$ sudo /sbin/ifconfig br0 up
.br
$ firejail --ip=10.10.20.67 --netmask=255.255.255.0 --defaultgw=10.10.20.1

.TP
\fB\-\-netns=name
Run the program in a named, persistent network namespace.  These can
be created and configured using "ip netns".

.TP
\fB\-\-netstats
Monitor network namespace statistics, see \fBMONITORING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-netstats
.br
PID  User    RX(KB/s) TX(KB/s) Command
.br
1294 netblue 53.355   1.473    firejail \-\-net=eth0 firefox
.br
7383 netblue 9.045    0.112    firejail \-\-net=eth0 transmission
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-nettrace[=name|pid]
Monitor received TCP. UDP, and ICMP traffic. The sandbox can be specified by name or pid. Only networked sandboxes
created with \-\-net are supported. This option is only available when running the sandbox as root.
.br

.br
Without a name/pid, Firejail will monitor the main system network namespace.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo firejail --nettrace
.br
                       93 KB/s  address:port (protocol) network
.br
  14 B/s  **                    104.24.8.4:443(QUIC) Cloudflare
.br
  80 KB/s *****************     192.187.97.90:443(TLS) BitChute
.br
   1 B/s                        149.56.228.45:443(DoH) Canada
.br
(D)isplay, (S)ave, (C)lear, e(X)it
.br

.br
If /usr/bin/geoiplookup is installed (geoip-bin package in Debian),
the country the traffic originates from is added to the trace.
We also use the static IP map in /usr/lib/firejail/static-ip-map
to print the domain names for some of the more common websites and cloud platforms.
No external services are contacted for reverse IP lookup.
.TP
\fB\-\-nice=value
Set nice value for all processes running inside the sandbox.
Only root may specify a negative value.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --nice=2 firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-no3d
Disable 3D hardware acceleration.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --no3d firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-noautopulse\fR (deprecated)
See --keep-config-pulse.

.TP
\fB\-\-noblacklist=dirname_or_filename
Disable blacklist for this directory or file.
.br

Note that blacklist entries containing ${PATH} can not currently be partially
disabled for individual expanded paths. Only the whole unexpanded path
including ${PATH} can be disabled, which then applies to all expansions.
This limitation does not apply to expansions of other variables or wildcards.
For details, see
.UR https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/6360
#6360
.UE
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail
.br
$ nc dict.org 2628
.br
bash: /bin/nc: Permission denied
.br
$ exit
.br

.br
$ firejail --noblacklist=/bin/nc
.br
bash: /bin/nc: Permission denied
.br
$ exit
.br

.br
$ firejail --noblacklist='${PATH}/nc'
.br
$ nc dict.org 2628
.br
220 pan.alephnull.com dictd 1.12.1/rf on Linux 3.14-1-amd64
.br
.TP
\fB\-\-nodbus\fR (deprecated)
#ifdef HAVE_DBUSPROXY
Disable D-Bus access (both system and session buses). Equivalent to --dbus-system=none --dbus-user=none.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-nodbus \-\-net=none
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-nodvd
Disable DVD and audio CD devices.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-nodvd
.TP
\fB\-\-noexec=dirname_or_filename
Remount directory or file noexec, nodev and nosuid. File globbing is supported, see \fBFILE GLOBBING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-noexec=/tmp
.br

.br
/etc and /var are noexec by default if the sandbox was started as a regular user.

.TP
\fB\-\-nogroups
Disable supplementary groups. Without this option, supplementary groups are enabled for the user starting the
sandbox. For root user supplementary groups are always disabled.
.br

.br
Note: By default all regular user groups are removed with the exception of the current user. This can be changed
using \-\-allusers command option.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ id
.br
uid=1000(netblue) gid=1000(netblue) groups=1000(netblue),24(cdrom),25(floppy),27(sudo),29(audio)
.br
$ firejail \-\-nogroups
.br
Parent pid 8704, child pid 8705
.br
Child process initialized
.br
$ id
.br
uid=1000(netblue) gid=1000(netblue) groups=1000(netblue)
.br
$

.TP
\fB\-\-noinput
Disable input devices.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-noinput

.TP
\fB\-\-nonewprivs
Sets the NO_NEW_PRIVS prctl.  This ensures that child processes
cannot acquire new privileges using execve(2);  in particular,
this means that calling a suid binary (or one with file capabilities)
does not result in an increase of privilege. This option
is enabled by default if seccomp filter is activated.

.TP
\fB\-\-noprinters
Disable printers.

.TP
\fB\-\-noprofile
Do not use a security profile.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail
.br
Reading profile /etc/firejail/default.profile
.br
Parent pid 8553, child pid 8554
.br
Child process initialized
.br
[...]
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-noprofile
.br
Parent pid 8553, child pid 8554
.br
Child process initialized
.br
[...]
#ifdef HAVE_USERNS
.TP
\fB\-\-noroot
Install a user namespace with a single user - the current user.
root user does not exist in the new namespace. This option
requires a Linux kernel version 3.8 or newer. The option
is not supported for \-\-chroot and \-\-overlay configurations,
or for sandboxes started as root.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-noroot
.br
Parent pid 8553, child pid 8554
.br
Child process initialized
.br
$ ping google.com
.br
ping: icmp open socket: Operation not permitted
.br
$
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-nosound
Disable sound system.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-nosound firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-notpm
Disable Trusted Platform Module (TPM) devices.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-notpm

.TP
\fB\-\-notv
Disable DVB (Digital Video Broadcasting) TV devices.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-notv vlc

.TP
\fB\-\-nou2f
Disable U2F devices.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-nou2f

.TP
\fB\-\-novideo
Disable video devices.
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-nowhitelist=dirname_or_filename
Disable whitelist for this directory or file.

.TP
\fB\-\-oom=value
Configure kernel's OutOfMemory-killer score for this sandbox. The acceptable score values are between 0 and 1000
for regular users, and -1000 to 1000 for root. For more information on OOM kernel feature see \fBman choom\fR.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-oom=300 firefox

#ifdef HAVE_OUTPUT
.TP
\fB\-\-output=logfile
stdout logging and log rotation. Copy stdout to logfile, and keep the size of the file under 500KB using log
rotation. Five files with prefixes .1 to .5 are used in rotation.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-output=sandboxlog /bin/bash
.br
[...]
.br
$ ls -l sandboxlog*
.br
-rw-r--r-- 1 netblue netblue 333890 Jun  2 07:48 sandboxlog
.br
-rw-r--r-- 1 netblue netblue 511488 Jun  2 07:48 sandboxlog.1
.br
-rw-r--r-- 1 netblue netblue 511488 Jun  2 07:48 sandboxlog.2
.br
-rw-r--r-- 1 netblue netblue 511488 Jun  2 07:48 sandboxlog.3
.br
-rw-r--r-- 1 netblue netblue 511488 Jun  2 07:48 sandboxlog.4
.br
-rw-r--r-- 1 netblue netblue 511488 Jun  2 07:48 sandboxlog.5

.TP
\fB\-\-output-stderr=logfile
Similar to \-\-output, but stderr is also stored.
#endif

#ifdef HAVE_OVERLAYFS
.TP
\fB\-\-overlay
Mount a filesystem overlay on top of the current filesystem.  Unlike the regular filesystem container,
the system directories are mounted read-write. All filesystem modifications go into the overlay.
Directories /run, /tmp and /dev are not covered by the overlay. The overlay is stored in $HOME/.firejail/<PID> directory.
If the sandbox is started as a regular user, nonewprivs and a default capabilities filter are enabled.
.br

.br
OverlayFS support is required in Linux kernel for this option to work.
OverlayFS was officially introduced in Linux kernel version 3.18.
This option is not available on Grsecurity systems.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-overlay firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-overlay-clean
Clean all overlays stored in $HOME/.firejail directory.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-overlay-clean

.TP
\fB\-\-overlay-named=name
Mount a filesystem overlay on top of the current filesystem.  Unlike the regular filesystem container,
the system directories are mounted read-write. All filesystem modifications go into the overlay.
Directories /run, /tmp and /dev are not covered by the overlay. The overlay is stored in $HOME/.firejail/<NAME> directory.
The created overlay can be reused between multiple sessions.
If the sandbox is started as a regular user, nonewprivs and a default capabilities filter are enabled.
.br

.br
OverlayFS support is required in Linux kernel for this option to work.
OverlayFS was officially introduced in Linux kernel version 3.18.
This option is not available on Grsecurity systems.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-overlay-named=jail1 firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-overlay-tmpfs
Mount a filesystem overlay on top of the current filesystem. All filesystem modifications
are discarded when the sandbox is closed. Directories /run, /tmp and /dev are not covered by the overlay.
If the sandbox is started as a regular user, nonewprivs and a default capabilities filter are enabled.
.br

.br
OverlayFS support is required in Linux kernel for this option to work.
OverlayFS was officially introduced in Linux kernel version 3.18.
This option is not available on Grsecurity systems.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-overlay-tmpfs firefox
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-private
Mount new /root and /home/user directories in temporary
filesystems. All modifications are discarded when the sandbox is
closed.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-private firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-private=directory
Use directory as user home.
--private and --private=directory cannot be used together.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-private=/home/netblue/firefox-home firefox
.br

.br
Bug: Even with this enabled, some commands (such as mkdir, mkfile and
private-cache) will still operate on the original home directory.
Workaround: Disable the incompatible commands, such as by using "ignore mkdir"
and "ignore mkfile".
For details, see
.UR https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/903
#903
.UE

.TP
\fB\-\-private-bin=file,file
Build a new /bin in a temporary filesystem, and copy the programs in the list.
The files in the list must be expressed as relative to the /bin,
/sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, or /usr/local/bin directories.
If no listed files are found, /bin directory will be empty.
The same directory is also bind-mounted over /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin and /usr/local/bin.
All modifications are discarded when the sandbox is closed.
Multiple private-bin commands are allowed and they accumulate.
File globbing is supported, see \fBFILE GLOBBING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-private-bin=bash,cat,ls,sed
.br
Parent pid 20841, child pid 20842
.br
Child process initialized
.br
$ ls /bin
.br
bash  cat  ls  sed

.TP
\fB\-\-private-cache
Mount an empty temporary filesystem on top of the .cache directory in user home. All
modifications are discarded when the sandbox is closed.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-private-cache openbox

.TP
\fB\-\-private-cwd
Set working directory inside jail to the home directory, and failing that, the root directory.
Does not impact working directory of profile include paths.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ pwd
.br
/tmp
.br
$ firejail \-\-private-cwd
.br
$ pwd
.br
/home/user
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-private-cwd=directory
Set working directory inside the jail.
Full directory path is required. Symbolic links are not allowed.
Does not impact working directory of profile include paths.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ pwd
.br
/tmp
.br
$ firejail \-\-private-cwd=/opt
.br
$ pwd
.br
/opt
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-private-dev
Create a new /dev directory.
Only disc, dri, dvb, full, hidraw, log, null, ptmx, pts, random, shm, snd, tpm,
tty, urandom, usb, video and zero devices are available.
Use the options \-\-no3d, \-\-nodvd, \-\-nosound, \-\-notpm, \-\-notv,
\-\-nou2f and \-\-novideo for additional restrictions.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-private-dev
.br
Parent pid 9887, child pid 9888
.br
Child process initialized
.br
$ ls /dev
.br
cdrom  cdrw  dri  dvd  dvdrw  full  log  null  ptmx  pts  random  shm  snd  sr0  tty  urandom  zero
.br
$
.TP
\fB\-\-private-etc, \-\-private-etc=@group,file,directory
The files installed by \-\-private-etc are copies of the original system files from /etc directory.
By default, the command brings in a skeleton of files and directories used by most console tools:

$ firejail --private-etc dig debian.org

For X11/GTK/QT/Gnome/KDE  programs add @x11 group as a parameter. Example:

$ firejail --private-etc=@x11,gcrypt,python* gimp

gcrypt and /etc/python* directories are not part of the generic @x11 group.
File globbing is supported.

For games, add @games group:

$ firejail --private-etc=@games,@x11 warzone2100

Sound and networking files are included automatically, unless \-\-nosound or \-\-net=none are specified.
Files for encrypted TLS/SSL protocol are in @tls-ca group.

$ firejail --private-etc=@tls-ca,wgetrc wget https://debian.org


Note: The easiest way to extract the list of /etc files accessed by your program is using strace utility:

$ strace /usr/bin/transmission-qt 2>&1 | grep open | grep etc
#ifdef HAVE_PRIVATE_HOME
.TP
\fB\-\-private-home=file,directory
Build a new user home in a temporary
filesystem, and copy the files and directories in the list in the
new home.
The files and directories in the list must be expressed as relative to
the current user's home directory.
All modifications are discarded when the sandbox is
closed.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-private-home=.mozilla firefox
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PRIVATE_LIB
.TP
\fB\-\-private-lib=file,directory
This feature is currently under heavy development. Only amd64 platforms are supported at this moment.
The files and directories in the list must be expressed as relative to
the /lib directory.
The idea is to build a new /lib in a temporary filesystem,
with only the library files necessary to run the application.
It could be as simple as:
.br

.br
$ firejail --private-lib galculator
.br

.br
but it gets complicated really fast:
.br

.br
$ firejail --private-lib=x86_64-linux-gnu/xed,x86_64-linux-gnu/gdk-pixbuf-2.0,libenchant.so.1,librsvg-2.so.2 xed
.br

.br
The feature is integrated with \-\-private-bin:
.br

.br
$ firejail --private-lib --private-bin=bash,ls,ps
.br
$ ls /lib
.br
ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 libgpg-error.so.0 libprocps.so.6 libsystemd.so.0
.br
libc.so.6 liblz4.so.1 libpthread.so.0 libtinfo.so.5
.br
libdl.so.2 liblzma.so.5 librt.so.1 x86_64-linux-gnu
.br
libgcrypt.so.20 libpcre.so.3 libselinux.so.1
.br
$ ps
.br
 PID TTY          TIME CMD
.br
    1 pts/0    00:00:00 firejail
.br
   45 pts/0    00:00:00 bash
.br
   48 pts/0    00:00:00 ps
.br
$
.br

.br
Note: Support for this command is controlled in firejail.config with the
\fBprivate-lib\fR option.
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-private-opt=file,directory
Build a new /opt in a temporary
filesystem, and copy the files and directories in the list.
The files and directories in the list must be expressed as relative to
the /opt directory, and must not contain the / character
(e.g., /opt/foo must be expressed as foo, but /opt/foo/bar --
expressed as foo/bar -- is disallowed).
If no listed file is found, /opt directory will be empty.
All modifications are discarded when the sandbox is closed.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --private-opt=firefox /opt/firefox/firefox
.br

.br
Note: Program installations in /opt tend to be relatively large and private-opt
copies the entire path(s) into RAM, which may significantly increase RAM usage
and break \fBfile-copy-limit\fR in firejail.config.
Therefore, in general it is recommended to use "whitelist /opt/PATH" instead of
"private-opt PATH".
For details, see
.UR https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/discussions/5307
#5307
.UE

.TP
\fB\-\-private-srv=file,directory
Build a new /srv in a temporary
filesystem, and copy the files and directories in the list.
The files and directories in the list must be expressed as relative to
the /srv directory, and must not contain the / character
(e.g., /srv/foo must be expressed as foo, but /srv/foo/bar --
expressed as srv/bar -- is disallowed).
If no listed file is found, /srv directory will be empty.
All modifications are discarded when the sandbox is closed.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
# firejail --private-srv=www /etc/init.d/apache2 start

.TP
\fB\-\-private-tmp
Mount an empty temporary filesystem on top of /tmp directory whitelisting X11 and PulseAudio sockets.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-private-tmp
.br
$ ls -al /tmp
.br
drwxrwxrwt  4 nobody nogroup   80 Apr 30 11:46 .
.br
drwxr-xr-x 30 nobody nogroup 4096 Apr 26 22:18 ..
.br
drwx------  2 nobody nogroup 4096 Apr 30 10:52 pulse-PKdhtXMmr18n
.br
drwxrwxrwt  2 nobody nogroup 4096 Apr 30 10:52 .X11-unix
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-profile=filename_or_profilename
Load a custom security profile from filename. For filename use an absolute path or a path relative to the current path.
For more information, see \fBSECURITY PROFILES\fR section below.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-profile=myprofile

.TP
\fB\-\-profile.print=name|pid
Print the name of the profile file for the sandbox identified by name or or PID.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-profile.print=browser
.br
/etc/firejail/firefox.profile
.br
.TP
\fB\-\-protocol=protocol,protocol,protocol
Enable protocol filter. The filter is based on seccomp and checks the first argument to socket system call.
Recognized values: unix, inet, inet6, netlink, packet, and bluetooth. This option is not supported for i386 architecture.
Multiple protocol commands are allowed and they accumulate.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-protocol=unix,inet,inet6 firefox
.TP
\fB\-\-protocol.print=name|pid
Print the protocol filter for the sandbox identified by name or PID.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=mybrowser firefox &
.br
$ firejail \-\-protocol.print=mybrowser
.br
unix,inet,inet6,netlink
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-list
.br
3272:netblue::firejail \-\-private firefox
.br
$ firejail \-\-protocol.print=3272
.br
unix,inet,inet6,netlink
#ifdef HAVE_FILE_TRANSFER
.TP
\fB\-\-put=name|pid src-filename dest-filename
Put a file in sandbox container, see \fBFILE TRANSFER\fR section for more details.
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-quiet
Turn off Firejail's output.
.br

.br
The same effect can be obtained by setting an environment variable FIREJAIL_QUIET to yes.
.TP
\fB\-\-read-only=dirname_or_filename
Set directory or file read-only. File globbing is supported, see \fBFILE GLOBBING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-read-only=~/.mozilla firefox
.br
.TP
\fB\-\-read-write=dirname_or_filename
Set directory or file read-write. Only files or directories belonging to the current user are allowed for
this operation. File globbing is supported, see \fBFILE GLOBBING\fR section for more details.
Example:
.br

.br
$ mkdir ~/test
.br
$ touch ~/test/a
.br
$ firejail --read-only=~/test --read-write=~/test/a


.TP
\fB\-\-restrict-namespaces
Install a seccomp filter that blocks attempts to create new cgroup, ipc, net, mount, pid, time, user or uts namespaces.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-restrict-namespaces

.TP
\fB\-\-restrict-namespaces=cgroup,ipc,net,mnt,pid,time,user,uts
Install a seccomp filter that blocks attempts to create any of the specified namespaces. The filter examines
the arguments of clone, unshare and setns system calls and returns error EPERM to the process
(or kills it or logs the attempt, see \-\-seccomp-error-action below) if necessary. Note that the filter is not
able to examine the arguments of clone3 system calls, and always responds to these calls with error ENOSYS.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-restrict-namespaces=user,net

.TP
\fB\-\-rlimit-as=number
Set the maximum size of the process's virtual memory (address space) in bytes.
Use k(ilobyte), m(egabyte) or g(igabyte) for size suffix (base 1024).

.TP
\fB\-\-rlimit-cpu=number
Set the maximum limit, in seconds, for the amount of CPU time each
sandboxed process can consume. When the limit is reached, the processes are killed.

The CPU limit is a limit on CPU seconds rather than elapsed time. CPU seconds is basically how many seconds
the CPU has been in use and does not necessarily directly relate to the elapsed time. Linux kernel keeps
track of CPU seconds for each process independently.

.TP
\fB\-\-rlimit-fsize=number
Set the maximum file size that can be created by a process.
Use k(ilobyte), m(egabyte) or g(igabyte) for size suffix (base 1024).
.TP
\fB\-\-rlimit-nofile=number
Set the maximum number of files that can be opened by a process.
.TP
\fB\-\-rlimit-nproc=number
Set the maximum number of processes that can be created for the real user ID of the calling process.
.TP
\fB\-\-rlimit-sigpending=number
Set the maximum number of pending signals for a process.

.TP
\fB\-\-rmenv=name
Remove environment variable in the new sandbox.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-rmenv=DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-scan
ARP-scan all the networks from inside a network namespace.
This makes it possible to detect macvlan kernel device drivers running on the current host.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=eth0 \-\-scan
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-seccomp
Enable seccomp filter and blacklist the syscalls in the default list,
which is @default-nodebuggers unless \-\-allow-debuggers is specified,
then it is @default.

.br
To help creating useful seccomp filters more easily, the following
system call groups are defined: @aio, @basic-io, @chown, @clock,
@cpu-emulation, @debug, @default, @default-nodebuggers, @default-keep,
@file-system, @io-event, @ipc, @keyring, @memlock, @module, @mount,
@network-io, @obsolete, @privileged, @process, @raw-io, @reboot,
@resources, @setuid, @swap, @sync, @system-service and @timer.
More information about groups can be found in /usr/share/doc/firejail/syscalls.txt
.br

.br
The default list can be customized, see \-\-seccomp= for a description.
It can be customized also globally in /etc/firejail/firejail.config file.
.br

.br
System architecture is strictly imposed only if flag
\-\-seccomp.block-secondary is used. The filter is applied at run time
only if the correct architecture was detected. For the case of I386
and AMD64 both 32-bit and 64-bit filters are installed.
.br

.br
Firejail will print seccomp violations to the audit log if the kernel was compiled with audit support (CONFIG_AUDIT flag).
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-seccomp


.TP
\fB\-\-seccomp=syscall,@group,!syscall2
Enable seccomp filter, blacklist the default list and the syscalls or syscall groups
specified by the command, but don't blacklist "syscall2". On a 64 bit
architecture, an additional filter for 32 bit system calls can be
installed with \-\-seccomp.32.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-seccomp=utime,utimensat,utimes firefox
.br
$ firejail \-\-seccomp=@clock,mkdir,unlinkat transmission-gtk
.br
$ firejail '\-\-seccomp=@ipc,!pipe,!pipe2' audacious
.br

.br
Syscalls can be specified by their number if prefix $ is added,
so for example $165 would be equal to mount on i386.
.br

.br
Instead of dropping the syscall by returning EPERM, another error
number can be returned using \fBsyscall:errno\fR syntax. This can be
also changed globally with \-\-seccomp-error-action or
in /etc/firejail/firejail.config file.  The process can also be killed
by using \fBsyscall:kill\fR syntax, or the attempt may be logged with
\fBsyscall:log\fR.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-seccomp=unlinkat:ENOENT,utimensat,utimes
.br
Parent pid 10662, child pid 10663
.br
Child process initialized
.br
$ touch testfile
.br
$ ls testfile
.br
testfile
.br
$ rm testfile
.br
rm: cannot remove `testfile': No such file or directory
.br

.br
If the blocked system calls would also block Firejail from operating,
they are handled by adding a preloaded library which performs seccomp
system calls later. However, this is incompatible with 32 bit seccomp
filters.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-noprofile \-\-seccomp=execve sh
.br
Parent pid 32751, child pid 32752
.br
Post-exec seccomp protector enabled
.br
list in: execve, check list: @default-keep prelist: (null), postlist: execve
.br
Child process initialized in 46.44 ms
.br
$ ls
.br
Operation not permitted

.TP
\fB\-\-seccomp.block-secondary
Enable seccomp filter and filter system call architectures so that
only the native architecture is allowed. For example, on amd64, i386
and x32 system calls are blocked as well as changing the execution
domain with personality(2) system call.
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-seccomp.drop=syscall,@group
Enable seccomp filter, and blacklist the syscalls or the syscall
groups specified by the command. On a 64 bit architecture, an
additional filter for 32 bit system calls can be installed with
\-\-seccomp.32.drop.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-seccomp.drop=utime,utimensat,utimes,@clock
.br

.br
Instead of dropping the syscall by returning EPERM, another error
number can be returned using \fBsyscall:errno\fR syntax. This can be
also changed globally with \-\-seccomp-error-action or
in /etc/firejail/firejail.config file.  The process can also be killed
by using \fBsyscall:kill\fR syntax, or the attempt may be logged with
\fBsyscall:log\fR.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-seccomp.drop=unlinkat:ENOENT,utimensat,utimes
.br
Parent pid 10662, child pid 10663
.br
Child process initialized
.br
$ touch testfile
.br
$ ls testfile
.br
testfile
.br
$ rm testfile
.br
rm: cannot remove `testfile': No such file or directory
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-seccomp.keep=syscall,@group,!syscall2
Enable seccomp filter, blacklist all syscall not listed and "syscall2".
The system calls needed by Firejail (group @default-keep: prctl, execve, execveat)
are handled with the preload library. On a 64 bit architecture, an
additional filter for 32 bit system calls can be installed with
\-\-seccomp.32.keep.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-seccomp.keep=poll,select,[...] transmission-gtk

.TP
\fB\-\-seccomp.print=name|pid
Print the seccomp filter for the sandbox identified by name or PID.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=browser firefox &
.br
$ firejail --seccomp.print=browser
.br
 line  OP JT JF    K
.br
=================================
.br
 0000: 20 00 00 00000004   ld  data.architecture
.br
 0001: 15 01 00 c000003e   jeq ARCH_64 0003 (false 0002)
.br
 0002: 06 00 00 7fff0000   ret ALLOW
.br
 0003: 20 00 00 00000000   ld  data.syscall-number
.br
 0004: 35 01 00 40000000   jge X32_ABI true:0006 (false 0005)
.br
 0005: 35 01 00 00000000   jge read 0007 (false 0006)
.br
 0006: 06 00 00 00050001   ret ERRNO(1)
.br
 0007: 15 41 00 0000009a   jeq modify_ldt 0049 (false 0008)
.br
 0008: 15 40 00 000000d4   jeq lookup_dcookie 0049 (false 0009)
.br
 0009: 15 3f 00 0000012a   jeq perf_event_open 0049 (false 000a)
.br
 000a: 15 3e 00 00000137   jeq process_vm_writev 0049 (false 000b)
.br
 000b: 15 3d 00 0000009c   jeq _sysctl 0049 (false 000c)
.br
 000c: 15 3c 00 000000b7   jeq afs_syscall 0049 (false 000d)
.br
 000d: 15 3b 00 000000ae   jeq create_module 0049 (false 000e)
.br
 000e: 15 3a 00 000000b1   jeq get_kernel_syms 0049 (false 000f)
.br
 000f: 15 39 00 000000b5   jeq getpmsg 0049 (false 0010)
.br
 0010: 15 38 00 000000b6   jeq putpmsg 0049 (false 0011)
.br
 0011: 15 37 00 000000b2   jeq query_module 0049 (false 0012)
.br
 0012: 15 36 00 000000b9   jeq security 0049 (false 0013)
.br
 0013: 15 35 00 0000008b   jeq sysfs 0049 (false 0014)
.br
 0014: 15 34 00 000000b8   jeq tuxcall 0049 (false 0015)
.br
 0015: 15 33 00 00000086   jeq uselib 0049 (false 0016)
.br
 0016: 15 32 00 00000088   jeq ustat 0049 (false 0017)
.br
 0017: 15 31 00 000000ec   jeq vserver 0049 (false 0018)
.br
 0018: 15 30 00 0000009f   jeq adjtimex 0049 (false 0019)
.br
 0019: 15 2f 00 00000131   jeq clock_adjtime 0049 (false 001a)
.br
 001a: 15 2e 00 000000e3   jeq clock_settime 0049 (false 001b)
.br
 001b: 15 2d 00 000000a4   jeq settimeofday 0049 (false 001c)
.br
 001c: 15 2c 00 000000b0   jeq delete_module 0049 (false 001d)
.br
 001d: 15 2b 00 00000139   jeq finit_module 0049 (false 001e)
.br
 001e: 15 2a 00 000000af   jeq init_module 0049 (false 001f)
.br
 001f: 15 29 00 000000ad   jeq ioperm 0049 (false 0020)
.br
 0020: 15 28 00 000000ac   jeq iopl 0049 (false 0021)
.br
 0021: 15 27 00 000000f6   jeq kexec_load 0049 (false 0022)
.br
 0022: 15 26 00 00000140   jeq kexec_file_load 0049 (false 0023)
.br
 0023: 15 25 00 000000a9   jeq reboot 0049 (false 0024)
.br
 0024: 15 24 00 000000a7   jeq swapon 0049 (false 0025)
.br
 0025: 15 23 00 000000a8   jeq swapoff 0049 (false 0026)
.br
 0026: 15 22 00 000000a3   jeq acct 0049 (false 0027)
.br
 0027: 15 21 00 00000141   jeq bpf 0049 (false 0028)
.br
 0028: 15 20 00 000000a1   jeq chroot 0049 (false 0029)
.br
 0029: 15 1f 00 000000a5   jeq mount 0049 (false 002a)
.br
 002a: 15 1e 00 000000b4   jeq nfsservctl 0049 (false 002b)
.br
 002b: 15 1d 00 0000009b   jeq pivot_root 0049 (false 002c)
.br
 002c: 15 1c 00 000000ab   jeq setdomainname 0049 (false 002d)
.br
 002d: 15 1b 00 000000aa   jeq sethostname 0049 (false 002e)
.br
 002e: 15 1a 00 000000a6   jeq umount2 0049 (false 002f)
.br
 002f: 15 19 00 00000099   jeq vhangup 0049 (false 0030)
.br
 0030: 15 18 00 000000ee   jeq set_mempolicy 0049 (false 0031)
.br
 0031: 15 17 00 00000100   jeq migrate_pages 0049 (false 0032)
.br
 0032: 15 16 00 00000117   jeq move_pages 0049 (false 0033)
.br
 0033: 15 15 00 000000ed   jeq mbind 0049 (false 0034)
.br
 0034: 15 14 00 00000130   jeq open_by_handle_at 0049 (false 0035)
.br
 0035: 15 13 00 0000012f   jeq name_to_handle_at 0049 (false 0036)
.br
 0036: 15 12 00 000000fb   jeq ioprio_set 0049 (false 0037)
.br
 0037: 15 11 00 00000067   jeq syslog 0049 (false 0038)
.br
 0038: 15 10 00 0000012c   jeq fanotify_init 0049 (false 0039)
.br
 0039: 15 0f 00 00000138   jeq kcmp 0049 (false 003a)
.br
 003a: 15 0e 00 000000f8   jeq add_key 0049 (false 003b)
.br
 003b: 15 0d 00 000000f9   jeq request_key 0049 (false 003c)
.br
 003c: 15 0c 00 000000fa   jeq keyctl 0049 (false 003d)
.br
 003d: 15 0b 00 000000ce   jeq io_setup 0049 (false 003e)
.br
 003e: 15 0a 00 000000cf   jeq io_destroy 0049 (false 003f)
.br
 003f: 15 09 00 000000d0   jeq io_getevents 0049 (false 0040)
.br
 0040: 15 08 00 000000d1   jeq io_submit 0049 (false 0041)
.br
 0041: 15 07 00 000000d2   jeq io_cancel 0049 (false 0042)
.br
 0042: 15 06 00 000000d8   jeq remap_file_pages 0049 (false 0043)
.br
 0043: 15 05 00 00000116   jeq vmsplice 0049 (false 0044)
.br
 0044: 15 04 00 00000087   jeq personality 0049 (false 0045)
.br
 0045: 15 03 00 00000143   jeq userfaultfd 0049 (false 0046)
.br
 0046: 15 02 00 00000065   jeq ptrace 0049 (false 0047)
.br
 0047: 15 01 00 00000136   jeq process_vm_readv 0049 (false 0048)
.br
 0048: 06 00 00 7fff0000   ret ALLOW
.br
 0049: 06 00 01 00000000   ret KILL
.br
$

.TP
\fB\-\-seccomp-error-action= kill | ERRNO | log
By default, if a seccomp filter blocks a system call, the process gets
EPERM as the error. With \-\-seccomp-error-action=error, another error
number can be returned, for example ENOSYS or EACCES. The process can
also be killed (like in versions <0.9.63 of Firejail) by using
\-\-seccomp-error-action=kill syntax, or the attempt may be logged
with \-\-seccomp-error-action=log. Not killing the process weakens
Firejail slightly when trying to contain intrusion, but it may also
allow tighter filters if the only alternative is to allow a system
call.
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-shutdown=name|pid
Shutdown the sandbox identified by name or PID.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-name=mygame \-\-caps.drop=all warzone2100 &
.br
$ firejail \-\-shutdown=mygame
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-list
.br
3272:netblue::firejail \-\-private firefox
.br
$ firejail \-\-shutdown=3272

.TP
\fB\-\-snitrace[=name|pid]
Monitor Server Name Indication (TLS/SNI). The sandbox can be specified by name or pid. Only networked sandboxes
created with \-\-net are supported. This option is only available when running the sandbox as root.
.br

.br
Without a name/pid, Firejail will monitor the main system network namespace.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo firejail --snitrace
.br
07:49:51  23.185.0.3       linux.com
.br
07:49:51  23.185.0.3       www.linux.com
.br
07:50:05  192.0.73.2       secure.gravatar.com
.br
07:52:35  172.67.68.93     www.howtoforge.com
.br
07:52:37  13.225.103.59    sf.ezoiccdn.com
.br
07:52:42  142.250.176.3    www.gstatic.com
.br
07:53:03  173.236.250.32   www.linuxlinks.com
.br
07:53:05  192.0.77.37      c0.wp.com
.br
07:53:08  192.0.78.32      jetpack.wordpress.com
.br
07:53:09  192.0.77.32      s0.wp.com
.br
07:53:09  192.0.77.2       i0.wp.com
.br
07:53:10  192.0.77.2       i0.wp.com
.br
07:53:11  192.0.73.2       1.gravatar.com
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-tab
Enable shell tab completion in sandboxes using private or whitelisted home directories.
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-private --tab
.TP
\fB\-\-timeout=hh:mm:ss
Kill the sandbox automatically after the time has elapsed. The time is specified in hours/minutes/seconds format.
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-timeout=01:30:00 firefox
.TP
\fB\-\-tmpfs=dirname
Mount a writable tmpfs filesystem on directory dirname. Directories outside user home or not owned by the user are not allowed. Sandboxes running as root are exempt from these restrictions. File globbing is supported, see \fBFILE GLOBBING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-tmpfs=~/.local/share
.TP
\fB\-\-top
Monitor the most CPU-intensive sandboxes, see \fBMONITORING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-top
.TP
\fB\-\-trace[=filename]
Trace open, access and connect system calls. If filename is specified, log
trace output to filename, otherwise log to console.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-trace wget -q www.debian.org
.br
Reading profile /etc/firejail/wget.profile
.br
3:wget:fopen64 /etc/wgetrc:0x5c8e8ce6c0
.br
3:wget:fopen /etc/hosts:0x5c8e8cfb70
.br
3:wget:socket AF_INET SOCK_DGRAM IPPROTO_IP:3
.br
3:wget:connect 3 8.8.8.8 port 53:0
.br
3:wget:socket AF_INET SOCK_STREAM IPPROTO_IP:3
.br
3:wget:connect 3 130.89.148.14 port 80:0
.br
3:wget:fopen64 index.html:0x5c8e8d1a60
.br

.br
parent is shutting down, bye...
.TP
\fB\-\-tracelog
This option enables auditing blacklisted files and directories. A message
is sent to syslog in case the file or the directory is accessed.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --tracelog firefox
.br

.br
Sample messages:
.br
$ sudo tail -f /var/log/syslog
.br
[...]
.br
Dec  3 11:43:25 debian firejail[70]: blacklist violation - sandbox 26370, exe firefox, syscall open64, path /etc/shadow
.br
Dec  3 11:46:17 debian firejail[70]: blacklist violation - sandbox 26370, exe firefox, syscall opendir, path /boot
.br
[...]
.br

.br
Note: Support for this command is controlled in firejail.config with the
\fBtracelog\fR option.
.TP
\fB\-\-tree
Print a tree of all sandboxed processes, see \fBMONITORING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-tree
.br
11903:netblue:firejail iceweasel
.br
  11904:netblue:iceweasel
.br
    11957:netblue:/usr/lib/iceweasel/plugin-container
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.br
11969:netblue:firejail \-\-net=eth0 transmission-gtk
#endif
.br
  11970:netblue:transmission-gtk

.TP
\fB\-\-version
Print program version/compile time support and exit.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-version
.br
firejail version 0.9.27

Compile time support:
    - AppArmor support is enabled
    - AppImage support is enabled
    - chroot support is enabled
    - file and directory whitelisting support is enabled
    - file transfer support is enabled
    - firetunnel support is enabled
    - networking support is enabled
    - overlayfs support is enabled
    - private-home support is enabled
    - seccomp-bpf support is enabled
    - user namespace support is enabled
    - X11 sandboxing support is enabled
.br
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fB\-\-veth-name=name
Use this name for the interface connected to the bridge for --net=bridge_interface commands,
instead of the default one.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-net=br0 --veth-name=if0
#endif
.TP
\fB\-\-whitelist=dirname_or_filename
Whitelist directory or file. A temporary file system is mounted on the top directory.
In the context of firejail, top directory means, if the whitelisted file's path is
for example /etc/somedir/somefile, then the top directory would be /etc.
All other top directories like /opt, /usr and so on, haven't changed, so all files there
are still accessible, unless a file or directory inside them is also whitelisted.
This is why sometimes it's beneficial to use blacklist in combination with whitelist,
if used for different top directories.
.br

.br
The whitelisted files are mount-binded inside. Modifications to whitelisted files are
persistent, everything else in the same top directory is discarded when the sandbox is closed.
.br

.br
The top directory can be most directories in /, but there are some special cases.
The /proc and /sys top directories aren't allowed, but /sys/module is allowed.
Also /run/user/$UID, $HOME and all directories in /usr are treated as a top directory.
.br

.br
Symbolic link handling: Whitelisting a path that is a symbolic link will also
whitelist the path that it points to.
For example, if ~/foo is whitelisted and it points to ~/bar, then ~/bar will
also be whitelisted.
.br
Restrictions: With the exception of the user home directory, both the link and
the real file should be in the same top directory.
For symbolic links in the user home directory, both the link and the real file
should be owned by the user.
.br

.br
File globbing is supported, see \fBFILE GLOBBING\fR section for more details.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-noprofile \-\-whitelist=~/.mozilla
.br
$ firejail \-\-whitelist=/tmp/.X11-unix \-\-whitelist=/dev/null
.br
$ firejail \-\-whitelist="/home/username/My Virtual Machines"
.br
$ firejail \-\-whitelist=/home/username/My\\ Virtual\\ Machines
.br
$ firejail \-\-whitelist=~/work* \-\-whitelist=/var/backups*

.TP
\fB\-\-writable-etc
Mount /etc directory read-write.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo firejail --writable-etc

.TP
\fB\-\-writable-run-user
Disable the default blacklisting of /run/user/$UID/systemd and /run/user/$UID/gnupg.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo firejail --writable-run-user

.TP
\fB\-\-writable-var
Mount /var directory read-write.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo firejail --writable-var

.TP
\fB\-\-writable-var-log
Use the real /var/log directory, not a clone. By default, a tmpfs is mounted on top of /var/log
directory, and a skeleton filesystem is created based on the original /var/log.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ sudo firejail --writable-var-log

#ifdef HAVE_X11
.TP
\fB\-\-x11
Sandbox the application using Xpra, Xephyr, Xvfb or Xorg security extension.
The sandbox will prevent screenshot and keylogger applications started inside the sandbox from accessing
clients running outside the sandbox.
Firejail will try Xpra first, and if Xpra is not installed on the system, it will try to find Xephyr.
If all fails, Firejail will not attempt to use Xvfb or X11 security extension.
.br

.br
Xpra, Xephyr and Xvfb modes require a network namespace to be instantiated in order to disable
X11 abstract Unix socket. If this is not possible, the user can disable the abstract socket
by adding "-nolisten local" on Xorg command line at system level.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-x11 --net=eth0 firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-x11=none
Blacklist /tmp/.X11-unix directory, ${HOME}/.Xauthority and the file specified in ${XAUTHORITY} environment variable.
Remove DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY environment variables.
Stop with error message if X11 abstract socket will be accessible in jail.

.TP
\fB\-\-x11=xephyr
Start Xephyr and attach the sandbox to this server.
Xephyr is a display server implementing the X11 display server protocol.
A network namespace needs to be instantiated in order to deny access to X11 abstract Unix domain socket.
.br

.br
Xephyr runs in a window just like any other X11 application. The default window size is 800x600.
This can be modified in /etc/firejail/firejail.config file.
.br

.br
The recommended way to use this feature is to run a window manager inside the sandbox.
A security profile for OpenBox is provided.
.br

.br
Xephyr is developed by Xorg project. On Debian platforms it is installed with the command \fBsudo apt-get install xserver-xephyr\fR.
This feature is not available when running as root.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-x11=xephyr --net=eth0 openbox

.TP
\fB\-\-x11=xorg
Sandbox the application using the untrusted mode implemented by X11 security extension.
The extension is available in Xorg package
and it is installed by default on most Linux distributions. It provides support for a simple trusted/untrusted
connection model. Untrusted clients are restricted in certain ways to prevent them from reading window
contents of other clients, stealing input events, etc.

The untrusted mode has several limitations. A lot of regular programs assume they are a trusted X11 clients
and will crash or lock up when run in untrusted mode. Chromium browser and xterm are two examples.
Firefox and transmission-gtk seem to be working fine.
A network namespace is not required for this option.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-x11=xorg firefox

.TP
\fB\-\-x11=xpra
Start Xpra (https://xpra.org) and attach the sandbox to this server.
Xpra is a persistent remote display server and client for forwarding X11 applications and desktop screens.
A network namespace needs to be instantiated in order to deny access to X11 abstract Unix domain socket.
.br

.br
On Debian platforms Xpra is installed with the command \fBsudo apt-get install xpra\fR.
This feature is not available when running as root.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail \-\-x11=xpra --net=eth0 firefox


.TP
\fB\-\-x11=xvfb
Start Xvfb X11 server and attach the sandbox to this server.
Xvfb, short for X virtual framebuffer, performs all graphical operations in memory
without showing any screen output. Xvfb is mainly used for remote access and software
testing on headless servers.
.br

.br
On Debian platforms Xvfb is installed with the command \fBsudo apt-get install xvfb\fR.
This feature is not available when running as root.
.br

.br
Example: remote VNC access
.br

.br
On the server we start a sandbox using Xvfb and openbox
window manager. The default size of Xvfb screen is 800x600 - it can be changed
in /etc/firejail/firejail.config (xvfb-screen). Some sort of networking (--net) is required
in order to isolate the abstract sockets used by other X servers.
.br

.br
$ firejail --net=none --x11=xvfb openbox
.br

.br
*** Attaching to Xvfb display 792 ***
.br

.br
Reading profile /etc/firejail/openbox.profile
.br
Reading profile /etc/firejail/disable-common.inc
.br
Reading profile /etc/firejail/disable-common.local
.br
Parent pid 5400, child pid 5401
.br

.br
On the server we also start a VNC server and attach it to the display handled by our
Xvfb server (792).
.br

.br
$ x11vnc -display :792
.br

.br
On the client machine we start a VNC viewer and use it to connect to our server:
.br

.br
$ vncviewer
.br

.TP
\fB\-\-xephyr-screen=WIDTHxHEIGHT
Set screen size for --x11=xephyr. The setting will overwrite the default set in /etc/firejail/firejail.config
for the current sandbox. Run xrandr to get a list of supported resolutions on your computer.
.br

.br
Example:
.br
$ firejail --net=eth0 --x11=xephyr --xephyr-screen=640x480 firefox
.br
#endif
.\" Note: Keep this in sync with invalid_name() in src/firejail/util.c.
#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
.SH APPARMOR
.TP
AppArmor support is disabled by default at compile time. Use --enable-apparmor configuration option to enable it:
.br

.br
$ ./configure --prefix=/usr --enable-apparmor
.TP
During software install, a generic AppArmor profile file, firejail-default, is placed in /etc/apparmor.d directory. The local customizations must be placed in /etc/apparmor.d/local/firejail-local. The profile needs to be loaded into the kernel by reloading apparmor.service, rebooting the system or running the following command as root:
.br

.br
# apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/firejail-default
.TP
The installed profile is supplemental for main firejail functions and among other things does the following:
.br

.br
- Disable ptrace. With ptrace it is possible to inspect and hijack running programs. Usually this is needed only for debugging. You should have no problems running Chromium or Firefox. This feature is available only on Ubuntu kernels.
.br

.br
- Whitelist write access to several files under /run, /proc and /sys.
.br

.br
- Allow running programs only from well-known system paths, such as /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin etc. Those paths are available as read-only. Running programs and scripts from user home or other directories writable by the user is not allowed.
.br

.br
- Prevent using non-standard network sockets. Only unix, inet, inet6, netlink, raw and packet are allowed.
.br

.br
- Deny access to known sensitive paths like .snapshots.

.TP
To enable AppArmor confinement on top of your current Firejail security features, pass \fB\-\-apparmor\fR flag to Firejail command line. You can also include \fBapparmor\fR command in a Firejail profile file. Example:
.br

.br
$ firejail --apparmor firefox
#endif

.SH DESKTOP INTEGRATION
A symbolic link to /usr/bin/firejail under the name of a program, will start the program in Firejail sandbox.
The symbolic link should be placed in the first $PATH position. On most systems, a good place
is /usr/local/bin directory. Example:
.PP
.RS
.br

.br
Make a firefox symlink to /usr/bin/firejail:
.br

.br
$ sudo ln -s /usr/bin/firejail /usr/local/bin/firefox
.br

.br
Verify $PATH
.br

.br
$ which -a firefox
.br
/usr/local/bin/firefox
.br
/usr/bin/firefox
.br

.br
Starting firefox in this moment, automatically invokes “firejail firefox”.
.RE
.br

.br
This works for clicking on desktop environment icons, menus etc. Use "firejail --tree"
to verify the program is sandboxed.
.PP
.RS
.br

.br
.br
$ firejail --tree
.br
1189:netblue:firejail firefox
.br
  1190:netblue:firejail firefox
.br
    1220:netblue:/bin/sh -c "/usr/lib/firefox/firefox"
.br
      1221:netblue:/usr/lib/firefox/firefox
.RE

We provide a tool that automates all this integration, please see \fBfirecfg\fR(1) for more details.

.SH EXAMPLES
.TP
\fBfirejail
Sandbox a regular shell session.
.TP
\fBfirejail firefox
Start Mozilla Firefox.
.TP
\fBfirejail \-\-debug firefox
Debug Firefox sandbox.
.TP
\fBfirejail \-\-private firefox
Start Firefox with a new, empty home directory.
.TP
\fBfirejail --net=none vlc
Start VLC in an unconnected network namespace.
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.TP
\fBfirejail \-\-net=eth0 firefox
Start Firefox in a new network namespace. An IP address is
assigned automatically.
.TP
\fBfirejail \-\-net=br0 \-\-ip=10.10.20.5 \-\-net=br1 \-\-net=br2
Start a shell session in a new network namespace and connect it
to br0, br1, and br2 host bridge devices. IP addresses are assigned
automatically for the interfaces connected to br1 and b2
#endif
.TP
\fBfirejail \-\-list
List all sandboxed processes.

.SH FILE GLOBBING
.TP
Globbing is the operation that expands a wildcard pattern into the
list of pathnames matching the pattern.  This pattern is matched at
firejail \fBstart\fR, and is NOT UPDATED at runtime.  \fBFiles matching
a blacklist, but created after firejail start will be accessible within
the jail.\fR Matching is defined by:
.br

.br
- '?' matches any character
.br
- '*' matches any string
.br
- '[' denotes a range of characters
.br
.TP
The globbing feature is implemented using glibc glob command. For
more information on the wildcard syntax see man 7 glob.
.br

.br
.TP
The following command line options are supported: \-\-blacklist,
\-\-private-bin, \-\-noexec, \-\-read-only, \-\-read-write,
\-\-tmpfs, and \-\-whitelist.
.br

.br
.TP
Examples:
.br

.br
$ firejail --private-bin=sh,bash,python*
.br
$ firejail --blacklist=~/dir[1234]
.br
$ firejail --read-only=~/dir[1-4]
.br

#ifdef HAVE_FILE_TRANSFER
.SH FILE TRANSFER
These features allow the user to inspect the filesystem container of an existing sandbox
and transfer files between the container and the host filesystem.

.TP
\fB\-\-cat=name|pid filename
Write content of a container file to standard out. The container is specified by name or PID.
If standard out is a terminal, all ASCII control characters except new line and horizontal tab
are replaced.

.TP
\fB\-\-get=name|pid filename
Retrieve the container file and store it on the host in the current working directory.
The container is specified by name or PID.

.TP
\fB\-\-ls=name|pid dir_or_filename
List container files. The container is specified by name or PID.

.TP
\fB\-\-put=name|pid src-filename dest-filename
Put src-filename in sandbox container.
The container is specified by name or PID.

.TP
Examples:
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-name=mybrowser --private firefox
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-ls=mybrowser ~/Downloads
.br
drwxr-xr-x netblue  netblue         4096 .
.br
drwxr-xr-x netblue  netblue         4096 ..
.br
-rw-r--r-- netblue  netblue         7847 x11-x305.png
.br
-rw-r--r-- netblue  netblue         6800 x11-x642.png
.br
-rw-r--r-- netblue  netblue        34139 xpra-clipboard.png
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-get=mybrowser ~/Downloads/xpra-clipboard.png
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-put=mybrowser xpra-clipboard.png ~/Downloads/xpra-clipboard.png
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-cat=mybrowser ~/.bashrc
.br
#endif

#ifdef HAVE_IDS
.SH INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IDS)
The host-based intrusion detection system tracks down and audits user and system file modifications.
The feature is configured using /etc/firejail/ids.config file, the checksums are stored in /var/lib/firejail/USERNAME.ids,
where USERNAME is the name of the current user. We use BLAKE2 cryptographic function for hashing.

As a regular user, initialize the database:
.br

.br
$ firejail --ids-init
.br
Opening config file /etc/firejail/ids.config
.br
Loading config file /etc/firejail/ids.config
.br
Opening config file /etc/firejail/ids.config.local
.br
500 1000 1500 2000
.br
2466 files scanned
.br
IDS database initialized
.br

.br
The default configuration targets several system executables in directories such as /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, and several critical config files in user home directory
such as ~/.bashrc, ~/.xinitrc, and ~/.config/autostart. Several system config files in /etc directory are also hashed.
.br

.br
Run --ids-check to audit the system:
.br

.br
$ firejail --ids-check
.br
Opening config file /etc/firejail/ids.config
.br
Loading config file /etc/firejail/ids.config
.br
Opening config file /etc/firejail/ids.config.local
.br
500 1000 1500
.br
Warning: modified /home/netblue/.bashrc
.br
2000
.br
2466 files scanned: modified 1, permissions 0, new 0, removed 0
.br

.br
The program will print the files that have been modified since the database was created, or the files with different access permissions.
New files and deleted files are also flagged.

Currently while scanning the file system, symbolic links are not followed, and files the user doesn't have read access to are silently dropped.
The program can also be run as root (sudo firejail --ids-init/--ids-check).
#endif

#ifdef HAVE_LANDLOCK
.SH LANDLOCK
Warning: Landlock support in firejail is considered experimental and unstable.
The contents of landlock-common.inc are likely to change and the feature is
still being expanded upon in the Linux kernel.
Also, note that its functionality overlaps with existing firejail features,
such as the \fBblacklist\fR, \fBread-only\fR and \fBread-write\fR commands.
Its filesystem access rules can currently only restrict direct access to paths;
it is not able to make only select paths appear in the sandbox such as with the
\fBwhitelist\fR and \fBprivate-etc\fR commands (see also unveil(2) on OpenBSD).
Lastly, note that depending on the Linux kernel version, Landlock may not
protect all of the relevant syscalls (see the kernel's Landlock documentation
for details).
Therefore, it is recommended to treat Landlock as an extra layer of protection,
to be used together with other firejail features (rather than as a bulletproof
mechanism by itself).
.PP
Landlock is a Linux security module first introduced in version 5.13 of the
Linux kernel.
It allows unprivileged processes to restrict their access to the filesystem.
Once imposed, these restrictions can never be removed, and all child processes
created by a Landlock-restricted processes inherit these restrictions.
Firejail supports Landlock as an additional sandboxing feature.
It can be used to ensure that a sandboxed application can only access files and
directories that it was explicitly allowed to access.
Firejail supports populating the ruleset with both a basic set of rules (see
landlock-common.inc) and with a custom set of rules.
.TP
Important notes:
.PP
.RS
- Currently only Landlock ABI version 1 is supported.
.PP
- If "lsm=" is used in the kernel command line, it should contain "landlock"
(such as "lsm=apparmor,landlock"), or else it will be disabled.
.PP
- A process can install a Landlock ruleset only if it has either
\fBCAP_SYS_ADMIN\fR in its effective capability set, or the "No New
Privileges" restriction enabled.
Because of this, enabling the Landlock feature will also cause Firejail to
enable the "No New Privileges" restriction, regardless of the profile or the
\fB\-\-nonewprivs\fR command line option.
.PP
- Access to the /etc directory is automatically allowed.
To override this, use the \fB\-\-writable\-etc\fR command line option.
You can also use the \fB\-\-private\-etc\fR option to restrict access to the
/etc directory.
.RE
.PP
To enable Landlock self-restriction on top of your current Firejail security
features, pass \fB\-\-landlock.enforce\fR flag to Firejail command line.
Without it, the other Landlock commands have no effect.
Example:
.PP
$ firejail \-\-landlock.enforce \-\-landlock.fs.read=/media mc
.PP
To disable Landlock self-restriction, use \fB\-\-ignore=landlock.enforce\fR.
#endif

.SH MONITORING
Option \-\-list prints a list of all sandboxes. The format
for each process entry is as follows:

	PID:USER:Sandbox Name:Command

Option \-\-tree prints the tree of processes running in the sandbox. The format
for each process entry is as follows:

	PID:USER:Sandbox Name:Command

Option \-\-top is similar to the UNIX top command, however it applies only to
sandboxes.

Option \-\-netstats prints network statistics for active sandboxes installing new network namespaces.

Listed below are the available fields (columns) in alphabetical
order for \-\-top and \-\-netstats options:

.TP
Command
Command used to start the sandbox.
.TP
CPU%
CPU usage, the sandbox share of the elapsed CPU time since the
last screen update
.TP
PID
Unique process ID for the task controlling the sandbox.
.TP
Prcs
Number of processes running in sandbox, including the controlling process.
.TP
RES
Resident Memory Size (KiB), sandbox non-swapped physical memory.
It is a sum of the RES values for all processes running in the sandbox.
.TP
RX(KB/s)
Network receive speed.
.TP
Sandbox Name
The name of the sandbox, if any.
.TP
SHR
Shared Memory Size (KiB), it reflects memory shared with other
processes. It is a sum of the SHR values for all processes running
in the sandbox, including the controlling process.
.TP
TX(KB/s)
Network transmit speed.
.TP
Uptime
Sandbox running time in hours:minutes:seconds format.
.TP
USER
The owner of the sandbox.

.SH NAME VALIDATION
For simplicity, the same name validation is used for multiple options.
Rules:
.PP
The name must be 1-253 characters long.
The name can only contain ASCII letters, digits and the special characters
"-._" (that is, the name cannot contain spaces or control characters).
The name cannot contain only digits.
The first and last characters must be an ASCII letter or digit and the name
may contain special characters in the middle.

.SH RESTRICTED SHELL
To configure a restricted shell, replace /bin/bash with /usr/bin/firejail in
/etc/passwd file for each user that needs to be restricted. Alternatively,
you can specify /usr/bin/firejail in adduser command:

adduser \-\-shell /usr/bin/firejail username

Additional arguments passed to firejail executable upon login are declared in /etc/firejail/login.users file.

.SH SECURITY PROFILES
Several command line options can be passed to the program using
profile files. Firejail chooses the profile file as follows:

1. If a profile file is provided by the user with --profile=FILE option, the profile FILE is loaded. If a profile name is given, it is searched for first in the ~/.config/firejail directory and if not found then in /etc/firejail directory. Profile names do not include the .profile suffix. If there is a file with the same name as the given profile name, it will be used instead of doing the profile search. To force a profile search, prefix the profile name with a colon (:), eg. --profile=:PROFILE_NAME.
Example:
.PP
.RS
$ firejail --profile=/home/netblue/icecat.profile icecat
.br
Reading profile /home/netblue/icecat.profile
.br
[...]
.RE

.PP
.RS
$ firejail --profile=icecat icecat-wrapper.sh
.br
Reading profile /etc/firejail/icecat.profile
.br
[...]
.RE

2. If a profile file with the same name as the application is present in ~/.config/firejail directory or
in /etc/firejail, the profile is loaded. ~/.config/firejail takes precedence over /etc/firejail. Example:
.PP
.RS
$ firejail icecat
.br
Command name #icecat#
.br
Found icecat profile in /home/netblue/.config/firejail directory
.br
Reading profile /home/netblue/.config/firejail/icecat.profile
.br
[...]
.RE

3. Use default.profile file if the sandbox
is started by a regular user, or server.profile file if the sandbox
is started by root. Firejail looks for these files in ~/.config/firejail directory, followed by /etc/firejail directory.
To disable default profile loading, use --noprofile command option. Example:
.PP
.RS
$ firejail
.br
Reading profile /etc/firejail/default.profile
.br
Parent pid 8553, child pid 8554
.br
Child process initialized
.br
[...]
.br

.br
$ firejail \-\-noprofile
.br
Parent pid 8553, child pid 8554
.br
Child process initialized
.br
[...]
.RE

See \fBman 5 firejail-profile\fR for profile file syntax information.
#ifdef HAVE_NETWORK
.SH TRAFFIC SHAPING
Network bandwidth is an expensive resource shared among all sandboxes running on a system.
Traffic shaping allows the user to increase network performance by controlling
the amount of data that flows into and out of the sandboxes.

Firejail implements a simple rate-limiting shaper based on Linux command tc.
The shaper works at sandbox level, and can be used only for sandboxes configured with new network namespaces.

Set rate-limits:

	$ firejail --bandwidth=name|pid set network download upload

Clear rate-limits:

	$ firejail --bandwidth=name|pid clear network

Status:

	$ firejail --bandwidth=name|pid status

where:
.br
	name - sandbox name
.br
	pid - sandbox pid
.br
	network - network interface as used by \-\-net option
.br
	download - download speed in KB/s (kilobyte per second)
.br
	upload - upload speed in KB/s (kilobyte per second)

Example:
.br
	$ firejail \-\-name=mybrowser \-\-net=eth0 firefox &
.br
	$ firejail \-\-bandwidth=mybrowser set eth0 80 20
.br
	$ firejail \-\-bandwidth=mybrowser status
.br
	$ firejail \-\-bandwidth=mybrowser clear eth0
#endif
.SH LICENSE
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
.PP
Homepage: https://firejail.wordpress.com
.SH SEE ALSO
.BR firemon (1),
.BR firecfg (1),
.BR firejail-profile (5),
.BR firejail-login (5),
.BR firejail-users (5),
.BR jailcheck (1)

.UR https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/wiki
.UE ,
.UR https://github.com/netblue30/firejail
.UE
.\" vim: set filetype=groff :
